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tent to which a particular case belongs to a specific category.
While scholars disagree on the necessity and utility of calcu-
lating such a score, one common rationale for doing so is that
this calculation fits nicely with how the human mind works.
Are we, perhaps, hard-wired to classify information according
to a partial membership process? Some important insights from
cognitive psychology on how we process and classify phe-
nomena lead us to think so.
In the “classical” view of categorization (Murphy 2004),
categories are defined by necessary and jointly sufficient con-
ditions for membership. For example, parliamentary democra-
cies may be defined by “assembly confidence,” wherein the
executive is both selected and removed by the legislature. This
view of concepts admits no borderline cases and treats each
member of the category as a full instance of the concept, with
no significant distinctions among members.
The modern view, associated closely with Ludwig Wittgen-
stein and Eleanor Rosch, shifted toward a more graded view of
concepts, thereby challenging the idea of well-defined mem-
bership and non-membership. Wittgenstein’s (1953) concept
of “family resemblance” undermines the idea that there is any
common (much less necessary) attribute of category members.
In Wittgenstein’s view, parliamentary systems might be a fam-
ily of systems whose members share—in varying combina-
tions—a substantial number of characteristics, such as execu-
tive decree, minimal legislative oversight of the executive, and
a figure-head for head of state. Rosch’s (e.g, 1975) large body
of experimental work advances the idea that people differenti-
ate with respect to the degree of belonging to a prototype. For
instance, Rosch showed that—in the framework of protoypes—
a chair is a highly typical instance of furniture, a bookcase less
typical,  and  a  piano  even  less  so.  This  focus  on  degree  of
belonging shifted the understanding of classification processes
away from the idea of sharply defined category membership
based on the conception of necessary and sufficient condi-
tions.
In political science, David Collier’s (Collier and Mahon
1993; Collier and Levitsky 1997) work on classical versus radial
subtyping highlighted the necessity of using graded ap-
proaches to categorization, particularly with central yet con-
tested concepts like “democracy.” Collier’s work left political
scientists with a stronger appreciation for partial membership
in categories, though he stopped short of recommending par-
ticular measurement instruments with which to assign scores.
I should note a parallel set of studies in cognitive psy-
chology that reveal a certain “categoriness” to the mind. That
is, for some concepts at least, we tend to lump phenomena into
classes and to minimize the conceptual distance between co-
classified items and exaggerate the distance between cross-
classified items. This phenomenon, categorical perception, is
evident with phenomena such as color, sounds, and—I sus-
pect—a fair number of learned categories such as those in
social science (Harnad 1990).
In sum, there appears to be a strong basis in cognitive
psychology for the idea that partial membership is central to
our neurological hard-wiring and “natural” categorization. It
also seems likely that the continuum underlying many of these
Almost any attempt at classification runs into a boundary prob-
lem. Some cases fit neatly into one category, some fit one cat-
egory only partially, and some fit multiple categories. This is a
well-understood issue among both cognitive psychologists,
who have documented how the brain’s hard-wiring classifies
stimuli, and taxonomists,1 who seek to “soft-wire” additional
sorting schemes. My focus here is mostly on the soft wiring.
How, exactly, should researchers build classification systems—
referred to here as taxonomies—that account for partial mem-
bership in categories, if at all? An important reference point is
fuzzy sets, an intriguing concept that has gained some traction
in sociology and political science. I explore a set of measure-
ment strategies for assigning partial membership scores in the
context of executive-legislative relations, a research domain
overdue for innovation in conceptualization and measurement.
Measuring Partial Membership in Categories?
I define a “partial membership score” as a measure of the ex-
Thanks to David Collier and Pam Paxton for helpful comments on
earlier drafts.
1 In this context, taxonomist refers broadly to scholars concerned
with classification, and not narrowly to specialists in biological tax-
onomy.
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classification schemes is subject to perceptual discontinuities
that lead to a natural clustering of items. Thus, membership,
but membership by degree. The question remains, however, of
how an analyst can adapt existing measurement practices to
reflect these ideas, in particular with respect to the learned
categories of social science.
A Point of Departure: Fuzzy Sets
These insights explain the appeal of fuzzy sets, which extend
the logic of set theory to graded membership (Zadeh 1965,
Smithson and Verkuilen 2006, Ragin 2008). Charles Ragin has
taken the lead in introducing fuzzy sets to the social sciences,
in connection with an analytical method known as Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA—the fuzzy set version is fsQCA).
For our purposes, it is important to separate QCA, the inferen-
tial method, from the concept of fuzzy sets. While the utility of
QCA is the subject of debate (including contributions to this
newsletter), fuzzy sets, at least as a descriptive device, are
considerably less contested. Still, much of the measurement
technology for fuzzy sets (at least for social science) has de-
veloped in the context of fs/QCA, and so it makes sense to
start there.
The appeal of fuzzy sets, as summarized by its propo-
nents, is clear:
With fuzzy sets, it is possible to have the best of both
worlds, namely the precision that is prized by quantitative
researchers and the use of substantive knowledge to cali-
brate measures that is central to qualitative research. (Ragin
2008: 82)
Assigning fuzzy set scores to cases is challenging, no
matter how one does it. Charles Ragin has offered a transpar-
ent approach, which seems to have some currency among fs/
QCA scholars. Ragin identifies two related methods, which he
labels “direct” and “indirect” (Ragin 2008). Both, at least in his
examples, build on continuous measures of an underlying con-
cept. In his classification of countries into the set of “devel-
oped” countries, for instance, he uses a continuous base mea-
sure of GDP/capita.
For the direct method, researchers “calibrate” the mea-
surement by identifying three “anchor points” in the base con-
tinuous measure: the points at which a case reaches (1) full
membership, (2) full non-membership, and (3) the crossover
point between membership and non-membership. Researchers
use these values to sort cases into one set or another and
compute scores between 0 and 1 by transforming deviations in
GDP/capita from the cross-over point with a log-odds func-
tion.2
The indirect method is similar to the direct method, except
that the analyst codes each case with one of the following six
membership scores, all of which reflect the level of member-
ship in a target set—for example, developed countries (Ragin
2008: 84). The six scores would be (1) full membership, (2)
mostly in, but not fully, (3) more in than out, (4) more out than
in, (5) mostly out, but not fully, or (6) full non-membership. The
2 See Ragin (2008: Chapter 5) for more detail.
analyst assigns each of these categories an equally spaced
number between zero and one (1.0, 0.8, 0.6,...) and then re-
gresses the scores on the base measure (GDP per capita) using
a fractional logit model. The predicted scores thereby become
the fuzzy set scores.  In some fsQCA applications, the number
of scores may be greater or less than six.
As is probably clear, both the direct and indirect approaches
to creating fuzzy-set membership require some strong theo-
retical assumptions regarding the location of the calibration
points. (All measurement approaches, of course, lean on theory
to some degree in order to build the ship at sea, as it were). It
seems likely that the location of these calibration points will
vary significantly across researchers (descriptive heterogene-
ity) and, relatedly, will vary with respect to the relationship of
the measure with other constructs (causal heterogeneity).
fsQCA seeks to take context into account, but the relevant
features of context can readily be well beyond the reach of any
standard approach to contextualization.
Consider an everyday example of descriptive heterogene-
ity. For any individual, there is some noticeable and abrupt
cross-over point between cold and hot. But this cross-over
point will depend on whether one is a Texan or a Minnesotan,
young or old, playing soccer or watching it from the stands,
and a never-ending list of other factors. If asked, each ob-
server would identify a different cross-over point based on
their own perception of temperature. In such a case, is it help-
ful to have a fuzzy-set score that indicates to which category a
certain temperature belongs? Does it make sense to say that
the temperature has a fuzzy-set membership of 0.43? Perhaps,
but it will depend crucially on an inter-subjective and inter-
contextual agreement about the location of crossover points.
It seems implausible that scholars can agree on crossover
points for a great many political variables of importance, such
as democracy or economic development. Ragin is quite candid
on this point:
The collective knowledge base of social scientists should
provide a basis for the specification of precise calibra-
tions. For example, armed with an adequate knowledge of
development, social scientists should be able to specify
the per capita income level that signals full membership in
the set of developed countries. However, the social sci-
ences are still in their infancy and this knowledge base
does not exist. (Ragin 2008: 86)
This acknowledgment of the difficult theoretical exercise
of assigning calibration points for economic development and
GDP per capita is telling. These two make for a well-known
concept/indicator pair and uncertainty in this domain suggests
that these decisions will be even more fraught in other do-
mains.
With respect to causal heterogeneity, it is quite possible
that base measures like GDP/capita are related to outcomes
along different functional forms. Imagine, for example, that two
outcomes interest a researcher: democracy and happiness. To
the extent that there are discontinuities in either of the two
GDP/capita-outcome relationships, it is likely that democracy
and happiness “kick in” at different levels of GDP/capita.
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If this is the case, the problem of causal heterogeneity
highlights the risky rescaling process inherent in both the di-
rect and indirect approaches to fuzzy-set membership. If one
agrees with Ragin that full membership is hard to establish,
even for familiar, widely-studied phenomena like development
and per capita income, then the complex gradations of full
membership and non-membership for many other phenomena
may be illusive indeed. Fuzzy-set measures may well add a
layer of complexity to the continuous measure, without a cor-
responding gain in meaning. Without a useful calibration point,
the fuzzy-set measure rescales the base measure into units
that are no longer directly observable or meaningful. Compare
a GDP/capita of $4500 to a fuzzy-set membership in the set of
developed countries equal to 0.43. While 0.43 is some function
of GDP/capita, it is no longer directly observable, not particu-
larly meaningful, and unclear whether two researchers with
different outcomes of interest will interpret the measure in the
same manner.
To be fair, fuzzy set scores are not alone in their intangibil-
ity. Many measurement strategies involve rescaling observ-
able scores, either by constraining their quantities between
endpoints or constraining their distributional parameters (e.g.,
normalizing, with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of
one). Researchers must therefore ask two questions. First, how
much does the rescaling procedure reduce interpretability?
Second, does the gain of rescaling outweigh the cost regard-
ing interpretation?
In fs/QCA, the benefit is presumably that the anchor points
have real meaning, indicating full membership, full non-mem-
bership, and the point between the two. And, in fact, Ragin
sees this calibration procedure as comparable to the creation
of a Celsius scale, in which zero and 100 degrees mean some-
thing real with respect to the effects of temperature on water.
To the extent that these calibration points do have real
intersubjective meaning, then perhaps moving beyond con-
crete units is a large benefit of rescaling. But, as discussed
above, the tenuous nature of the assignment process, even for
merely establishing full membership and non-membership,
makes it difficult to believe that the calibration points are actu-
ally interpretable in any consistent manner.
Fuzzy set measurements also seem to have some diffi-
culty, at least as they are specified, in fully representing the
meaning of a systematized concept. Let’s think of some ex-
amples of categories and cases that exhibit “boundary” prob-
lems: Olives (fruit), Poker (sport), and Duckbill Platypi (mam-
mals). These cases induce categorical head-scratching because
they share attributes with both co-classified cases and cross-
classified cases. In each case, they have been categorized as
such because researchers have preferred to privilege one di-
mension (respectively, seeds, competition, and mammary
glands) over another.  However, other secondary characteris-
tics are associated with cases in each category (again, respec-
tively: sweetness, athleticism, and internal gestation).
So, variance within categories derives in part from mul-
tiple, semi-related dimensions of the concept. A satisfying mea-
surement strategy would be one that could represent and test
the dimensionality of the category using multiple measures.
Combining multiple indicators both to represent the concept
more fully and to improve reliability is a virtue of most mea-
surement models, and something on which fuzzy sets—as con-
ventionally measured—fail to capitalize. Conventional fuzzy-
set measures typically identify, and measure membership for,
each set/dimension separately.
A Framework for Evaluation
The limitations of current fuzzy-set measurement practices cast
something of a shadow on the use of such measures in analy-
sis. As Ragin (2008: 71) himself notes, “the key to useful fuzzy-
set analysis is well-constructed fuzzy sets.” Unfortunately,
the measurement challenges leave the method—by its own
criteria—limited in its applications to the social sciences. One
wonders whether more attractive solutions are available for
measuring partial membership scores. But more attractive in
what way? Here, the foregoing examination of fuzzy-set mea-
surement practices can be helpful. Not only do these practices
serve as a focused reference point for comparison, but the
comparison suggests some useful criteria for evaluating such
measures.
Of course, researchers will have different analytic and de-
scriptive uses for partial membership scores. However, some
basic concerns seem relevant to anyone who builds or uses
partial membership—concerns that I express here in terms of
three points of inquiry. Whatever else they do, helpful mea-
surement strategies should be able to shed some light on one
or more of these points.
1. Homogeneity within Categories. How much diversity
is evident in the categories in question? That is, to what
degree can an analyst make the claim that categories are
sufficiently uniform?
2. Conceptual Architecture of Categories. Which attri-
butes are responsible for potential heterogeneity within a
category? That is, can we identify the multiple dimen-
sions, or components, that structure a category and pro-
duce its diversity?
3. Degree of Membership in Categories. To what degree
(with what probability) does a particular case “belong” to
a given category? That is, can we assign membership mean-
ingfully and generate useful partial membership scores?
Alternative Measurement Approaches and an Application
This exploration of partial membership methods is not an ab-
stract exercise for me. I have devoted many years to the Com-
parative Constitutions Project (CCP), with the goal of describ-
ing the world’s written constitutions, historic and contempo-
rary, and testing theories regarding the origins and conse-
quences of constitutional choices (Elkins, Ginsburg, Melton
2013). By reading and re-reading 800 constitutions, I have be-
come acutely aware that the constitutional landscape of the
world’s states is not particularly well-conceptualized. Specifi-
cally, we lack a well-developed sense of how constitutions
express rights, duties, powers, and principles and how these
properties co-vary. Moreover, we do not seem to have pro-
vided those who are in the business of writing constitutions
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with a helpful conceptual framework for understanding their
choices.
Executive-Legislative Relations
One of—if not the—most important decisions that constitu-
tional designers must make is how to structure the roles of the
executive and the legislature. For well over a century, political
scientists (and constitutional drafters) have conceptualized
this choice predominantly as one between two basic types:
presidentialism and parliamentarism. At least since de Gaulle, a
mixed type—sometimes called semi-presidentialism—has en-
tered the academic and political dialogue. Though other schol-
ars have suggested additional intermediate categories (e.g.,
Shugart and Carey 1992), for the purpose of this analysis we
will consider these three basic categories.
Perhaps because of its familiarity, this typology is highly
relevant to our purposes. The definitional criteria are rarely in
dispute. Presidential and parliamentary systems are usually
distinguished by two related attributes—the procedures for
the election and survival of the head of government. In a
parliamentary system, the assembly selects the head of gov-
ernment, who serves at their pleasure; in a presidential system,
citizens select the president, who serves for a fixed term.
In conjunction with these defining attributes, strong ste-
reotypes have developed about what these types look like
across a set of other secondary properties, which are often
denoted by three prototypic systems: the U.S., the British, and
the French. Mounting evidence, however, suggests that these
three types mask great diversity in executive-legislative sys-
tems (Shugart and Carey 1992, Tsebelis 2002, Cheibub et al.
2013); many presidential systems take on parliamentary at-
tributes and many parliamentary systems take on presidential
attributes. How can we take these partial memberships into
account?
Strategy One: A Continuous Scale Instead of Classification
A first potential strategy is to sidestep classification entirely—
thereby deliberately setting aside these three questions. After
all, the baseline conditions for measuring partial membership
require that concepts exhibit some combination of
“categoriness” and partial membership in such categories.
Many concepts, it seems, exhibit one but not the other. The
potential objection to measuring partial membership, there-
fore, is that a researcher either does not recognize any discon-
tinuity in a variable or does not know where to draw the bound-
ary lines.
In such a case, the dominant strategy is to build continu-
ous scales that tap gradations on a dimension (or dimensions)
of the particular concept. It is a familiar task for many scholars.
Indeed, the goal in most measurement models is not to classify
units, but rather to assign a score to the units across a con-
tinuous measure. Ideally, one would assemble a set of multiple
measurement items that both represent the systematized con-
cept adequately and improve the reliability of the overall score.
A long tradition of measurement strategies, based principally
on covariance structure modeling, allow for the construction
and testing of such measures. But even simpler scaling tech-
niques can deliver measures with graded scores that might
satisfy researchers ostensibly interested in partial member-
ship.
Thus, in the case of executive-legislative relations, a re-
searcher may be tempted to eschew classification—even a
classification system as familiar as the dichotomous presiden-
tialism versus parliamentarism—and instead opt for a continu-
ous scale that taps a primary dimension of the distinction.
Some very accomplished scholars have built exactly these sorts
of scales, which are central to the executive-legislature rela-
tionship (e.g., Shugart and Carey 1992, Fish and Kroenig 2009,
Tsebelis 2002, Lijphart 2012). To unpack some of the issues
involved in this sort of scaling, consider another scale: scope
of executive authority (power) as encoded in written constitu-
tions (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2013).
The data for this scale include measures of a comprehen-
sive range of executive and legislative powers. However, con-
structing a valid scale from these characteristics requires spe-
cial attention to aggregation and weighting. Because powers
are substitutable, it is not especially meaningful to simply add
powers, such as the executive veto or the executive’s initiation
of legislation. While executives may win in one arena (say, the
budget), this may come only after threatening the legislature in
another arena (say, military action); in general, power in one
domain will likely provide clout in another domain.
The implication of substitutability for measurement is that
these various powers will not necessarily correlate, which lim-
its their utility in standard measurement models.3 More pre-
cisely, these powers are not typical “reflective” indicators
(manifestations, or reflections, of the latent construct); rather,
they are “formative” indicators, in that they are causes of (or
routes to) to a latent variable.4 The set-up for formative indica-
tors is, importantly, quite different from standard reflective
models. The weighting for a given item in the scale is derived
not from its intercorrelation with other items, but from its pre-
diction of variables that are manifestations of the latent con-
struct. So, in order to identify the measurement model, one
needs to specify at least one reflective indicator (i.e., the out-
come) of the latent variable along with the host of formative
indicators (i.e., the potential causes).
Figure 1 depicts the relationships we theorize in a mea-
surement model of constitutional executive power. In measure-
ment modeling terms, this structure is known as a MIMIC (Mul-
tiple indicator, multiple cause) model. The outcome variables
are (1) the executive’s success rate in passing bills that origi-
nate from the executive and (2) the relative prestige of the
office (labeled as laws and prestige in the figure). The substi-
tutable power variables (which, again, are treated as causal) all
relate to a constitution’s degree of executive power, shown in
the six attributes in the figure.
3 Standard measurement models develop weights based on an item’s
intercorrelation with other items.
4 The idea of a latent variable is most useful if not over-inter-
preted—in the reified sense of an underlying phenomenon in the real
world; but rather is treated as a metaphor for the conceptual under-
standing of how and why these items (i.e., characteristics) may be
interrelated.
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Clearly, this sort of measurement scheme sidesteps classi-
fication and is therefore not helpful in answering the three
evaluative questions I raise above. However, it may also be
possible to approximate, or at least to explore, partial-set mem-
bership using a continuous measure. One approach would be
to test, iteratively, the effect of any discontinuities by employ-
ing a combination of continuous and dichotomous variables
in a regression and identifying, diagnostically, any disconti-
nuity in the association between the outcome and the con-
tinuum under consideration.
It may also be possible to combine the continuous mea-
sure with a related classification system in order to assess
internal diversity and, even, approximate degrees of member-
ship. So, in our example, one could pair a continuous measure
of executive power together with an existing classification of
parliamentary and presidential systems.  Assuming that execu-
tive power constitutes a dominant dimension of presidentialism
and parliamentarism, one may be able to describe degrees of
category membership.
Of course, this approach is probably not too dissimilar
from traditional fuzzy set practices, as described above, and
carries with it some of the aforementioned limitations. For ex-
ample, one must make the strong assumption that the continu-
ous measure is a dominant dimension of presidentialism and
parliamentarism. As we suggest above, it seems more likely
that categories would be defined by a mix of traits and that a
single continuum would describe only one of multiple dimen-
sions of the concept. Still, it may be instructive to calculate the
variation with respect to the one dimension (executive power)
within categories (presidentialism and parliamentarism) and
even to use the interaction of the two in analytic models.
One would want to be clear that these are not, strictly
speaking, partial membership scores. Still the joint effect of
membership and variation on a primary dimension of member-
ship would amount to something close to partial membership.
Nevertheless, one might more satisfactorily measure partial
membership with a more multidimensional approach.
Figure 1: MIMIC (Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes
Measurement Model of Executive Power
Legend
laws = success rate of executive-initiated bills
prestige = expert coding of executive importance
initiate = executive empowered to initiate legislation
decree = executive empowered to enact legislative decrees
emergency = executive empowered to declare state of emergency
veto = executive empowered to veto legislation
immunity = executive granted immunity from prosecution
dissolve = executive empowered to dissolve the legislature
Strategy Two: Similarity-Based
Measures of Family Resemblance
An approach more consistent with Wittgenstein’s idea of fam-
ily resemblance and Rosch’s prototype analysis is to group (or
at least measure similarities among) cases based on a set of
relevant characteristics. As in various algorithms used in clus-
ter analysis, the idea here is to calculate quantities of similarity
or distance among cases in light of their scores on a set of
presumably multidimensional characteristics. Further specify-
ing a prototypical case allows researchers to calculate an ex-
plicit measure of degree of membership: the distance between
each case and the prototype.
These kinds of methods are often employed in a more
exploratory fashion. They are useful for identifying units that
flock together, exploring alternative classification strategies,
and discovering different types or “species.” However, as I
suggest above, it is is possible to calculate partial membership
scores in a straightforward manner with these methods.
A first step might be to classify cases based on one or
more definitional attributes. In the case of presidentialism and
parliamentarism, such clasifications abound: here we use an
authoritative coding by Cheibub, who classifies cases based
on the selection and survival properties of the executive, as is
conventional. The next step is to identify a set of secondary
characteristics that are associated with membership in one or
more of the classes. It is then possible to build partial member-
ship scores for each case’s “resemblance” to identifiable “fami-
lies,” based on their values on these secondary characteris-
tics.
For example, Table 1 identifies seven attributes typically
associated with presidentialism, semi-presidentialism, and
parliamentrism. From these I calculate a simple measure of simi-
larity (the Pearson correlation between cases and across the
seven attributes) for each dyad in the data. The similarity to a
prototypical case constitutes a measure of partial membership.
For the 108 constitutions included in this analysis,5 Fig-
5 The sample includes all independent states for which the consti-
tution specifies executive-legislative relationships to a sufficient de-
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ure 2 depicts the distribution of the measure of similarity to the
United States, grouping cases according to whether they are
categorized as presidential, semi-presidential, parliamentary
based on the defining attributes. A score of 1.0 would repre-
sent perfect similarity (with the same values on all component
attributes); 0.0 would reflect the absence of any shared at-
tributes.
One way to interpret these scores is as a measure of the
degree to which cases belong in the “presidential” category,
defined by the U.S. prototype. The results are startling, though
they confirm something that institutional researchers (e.g.,
Shugart and Carey 1992) have suspected for years: there is
enormous heterogeneity within the classic categories.
Specifically, and counter-intuitively, the mean similarity
scores vis-à-vis the United States differ relatively little across
the three system types. Indeed, Parliamentary systems are, on
average, more similar to the U.S. prototype than are presiden-
tial systems—a rather shocking result. One could also analyze
the variance, by category, of each of the secondary character-
istics to determine which ones are more or less responsible for
the lack of family resemblance. It turns out that all of these
characteristics vary substantially (though to varying degrees)
within the three categories (Cheibub, Elkins, Ginsburg 2013).
All of this to say that this measure appears to provide
satisfactory answers to the three evaluative questions identi-
fied above. The scores allow us to assess the degree of hetero-
geneity and the sources of diversity within categories, and to
measure degree of membership. One could even imagine fur-
ther analyses in which one employed these family resemblance
scores in statistical models that use the classic typology, per-
haps by substituting the “degree of presidentialism” for a bi-
nary variable of presidentialism in a regression analysis.
So what do you do when you identify a family that does
not appear to exhibit much resemblance among its members?
Do you stop speaking of those families altogether? Do you
reject the findings and seek other, overlooked, characteristics
that are more related to the family line? Or do you use these
gree as to allow classification with respect to the three systems.
Table 1: Characteristics of Executive-Legislative Systems
System
Presidential Semi-Presidential Parliamentary
Assembly Confidence No For head of govt Yes
Executive decree No Depends Yes
Emergency powers Strong Strong Weak
Initiation of legislation Legislature Depends Executive
Legislative oversight Yes Depends No
Executive veto Yes Depends No
Cabinet appointment Executive Depends Legislature
new measures of familial distance to speak more accurately of
the family’s members—say, of siblings versus second, third,
and fourth cousins? In the case of executive-legislative rela-
tions, the second and third responses seem worth pursuing.
The family still matters: presidentialism and parliamentarism
still connote remarkably important differences between sys-
tems.
Of course, it is possible that I tested family resemblances
with characteristics that are not connected to the family’s
“DNA.” To evaluate this potential problem, it is useful to re-
visit our expectations regarding the secondary characteristics
and test the diversity question with other known concomi-
tants of presidentialism and parliamentarism. In fact, it really
does make sense to speak of close and distant relatives, given
that in further testing we do not find new evidence of homog-
enous families. Also, we are convinced that the secondary
characteristics originally tested really are attributes closely
associated with the family. It is therefore plausible, as in Figure
2, to suggest that Liberia (LBR) is a close Presidential member,
while Nicaragua (NIC) is something of a distant cousin.
One will note that these families are only plausible if we
are able to identify defining attributes with which to make such
designations. That makes sense in the case of the presidential
and parliamentary families. But what can we do if we are in a
purely Wittgenstein/Rosch-like world (as opposed to a Lin-
nean taxonomical world), in which we do not have the luxury of
necessary and sufficient conditions to define categories?
Strategy Three: Latent Class Analysis
The cluster-analytic techniques of Strategy Two are illuminat-
ing, but they are for the most part exploratory. They lack the
statistical properties that would justify more precise statements
about the degree to which particular units belong to catego-
ries. Latent Class Analysis (LCA), by contrast, provides some-
what more precise answers in this regard. It is a productive
third strategy, given that we are concerned with categorical
distinctions. LCA is a version of cluster analysis in which one
analyzes the attributes that characterize each category, and
uses estimates of the clustering of categories to sort cases
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Figure 2: Surprising Similarity to the United States of
Presidential, Semi-Presidential, and Parliamentary Systems
Note: N=137 national constitutions as of June 2013. Table includes independent states with constitutions that specify procedures for executive
selection and survival. A score of 1.0 signifies perfect similarity to the United States. Average similarity scores: Presidential 0.52; Semi-
Presidential 0.46; and Parliamentary 0.55.
into appropriate groupings. This analysis can estimate the prob-
ability that cases belong to a particular category, as well as the
association of the various items with each category.
In order to understand its uses, think of an everyday con-
cept, autism, the diagnosis of which many modern parents
puzzle over at some point. Like most of the learned concepts
under consideration here, autism is highly multidimensional,
and characterized by a variety of social, cognitive, and emo-
tional symptoms. It is also regularly treated as a category with
partial memberships within this multidimensional space (cases
are said to be somewhere on the “spectrum”), but member-
ships seem to matter nonetheless. “Having it” triggers certain
treatments, certain accommodations, and certain sympathies.
But how to assign membership given these multiple continu-
ous dimensions? LCA offers one approach, which not only
allows for the estimation of membership in a single category
(e.g., Autism) but also the estimation of membership in sub-
categories (e.g., Aspergers).
The parallel to executive-legislative relations is striking.
Presidentialism, parliamentarism, and semi-presidentialism are
as multidimensional and graded as any other category: how-
ever, the categories themselves matter. What can LCA tell us
about these classes and their members? An initial answer is
suggested by building on the characteristics listed in Table 1
and performing an LCA analysis. Table 2 reports a critical set
of quantities from this analysis: the probability of membership
in the three broad categories, for a selected set of countries.
These memberships, then, are graded and multiple. At the
same time, the probabilities suggest that cases may be as-
signed to one of the categories, based on the highest probabil-
ity in each row (shown in bold in Table 2). The number of
categories analyzed was fixed at three but that number can be
permitted to vary and, like the number of dimensions in confir-
matory factor analysis, should be subjected to close scrutiny.
The labeling of each category requires interpretation. In
Table 2, I have assigned labels to the categories, based on (a)
the clustering of cases; and (b) case scores on the defining
attributes of the categories.6 The results in Table 2 suggest
some intriguing answers with respect to partial membership. In
general, membership scores seem to corroborate those calcu-
lated in the cluster analysis above. The difference, now, is a
much more precise sense of how and why they do and do not
fit well. So, is Liberia presidential? Yes, unequivocally so. It
belongs to that category with a probability of 0.91 and to the
others at less than 0.30. Brazil, however, might just as easily be
categorized as semi-presidential (p = 0.56) as presidential (p =
0.60). And so on.
With respect to the criteria identified, we might think of
LCA as something like a more precise version of the family
6 The conditional probability of the items for each category is not
reported here. This probability essentially maps the relationship of
the items with the categories.
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resemblance measures in Strategy 2. That is, LCA allows us to
describe the diversity within categories and to assign partial
membership scores to individual cases. It also facilitates an
investigation of the architecture of the various categories
through an analysis of the correspondence between the vari-
ous attributes and category membership (though that analysis
is not shown here). The advantage over more informal cluster-
ing methods is a nuanced one. The LCA results, like those
generated in the cluster analysis, have a tight connection to
the idea of partial membership. The difference is that the LCA
results have a stronger, or at least more widely understood,
grounding in statistical and measurement theory.
Further Observations on Partial Membership in Categories
A final consideration that emerges from our evaluation of par-
tial membership strategies concerns the interpretation of scores.
Partial membership is not directly observable and the scores
generated from any of the methods under discussion will be
scientific constructs. Some of these constructs, however, are
simply more meaningful than others. Typical fuzzy set meth-
ods rely upon a calibration approach that depends upon some
rather aggressive assumptions about the location of set-mem-
bership boundaries, which then serve as reference points. Ul-
timately, it is not entirely clear what the scores surrounding
these boundaries mean, exactly. 0.4 may mean that a case is
slightly more out than in (if the set cutoff is 0.5), but that
relative judgment is not itself particularly easy to grasp, or to
convey to others.
In other methods, however, 0.4 may well have a more com-
prehensible, or at least more established, meaning. In a mea-
sure of family resemblance, that score—depending upon how
similarity is measured—may mean that a case shares 40 per-
Table 2: Latent Class Analysis: Probability of Membership in
Three Derived Categories for Selected Cases
cent of some group of characteristics with the category’s pro-
totype (if similarity is measured as percent matching) or that it
correlates at 0.4 with the set’s prototype (if similarity is mea-
sured as the correlation between two cases across their char-
acteristics). 0.4 in a LCA model suggests that a case belongs to
a particular category with a probability of 0.4. Any of these
interpretations are just as unobserved as are those in the fuzzy
set context. The difference is that these units are constructed
as mathematical concepts (probabilities, correlations, percent-
age) that need no introduction and have well understood prop-
erties. Ultimately, that sort of resonance will be important, at
least in a descriptive endeavor.
Conclusion
The idea of building taxonomies with partial membership is
compelling. The idea makes even more sense once we under-
stand insights from cognitive psychology about how our minds
process stimuli. But how to operationalize the idea of partial
membership? The concept of fuzzy sets is helpful, but the
measurement tools associated with that approach in the social
sciences, at least, are quite underdeveloped. Still, identifying
the shortcomings of extant fuzzy-set measurement practices
focuses our attention on some desirable properties of partial-
membership measures—and establishes a basis for evalua-
tion. Helpful measurement properties are found in some alter-
natives to fuzzy sets. In particular, clustering and latent-class
analytic methods generate family resemblance scores that seem
to deliver the punch that we expect from partial membership.
The illustrations in the domain of executive-legislative rela-
tions help us describe and diagnose the bounded nature of
some well-established categories, presidentialism and
parliamentarism.
Note: Numbers in bold indicate the highest category in each row. Substantive interpretation of categories is based on visual inspection of: (a)
clustering of cases; and (b) case scores on the defining attributes of the categories.
Categories, with Interpretation Shown in Brackets
    1    2 3
        [Presidential]      [Semi-Presidential] [Parliamentary]
Guatemala 0.46 0.32           0.22
Brazil 0.60 0.56           0.33
Peru 0.87 0.34           0.17
Liberia 0.91 0.28           0.12
Belarus 0.68 0.54           0.34
Ukraine 0.56 0.45           0.23
Russia 0.38 0.65           0.13
Denmark 0.21 0.39           0.69
Spain 0.15 0.34           0.95
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The illustration raises a set of questions about what, ex-
actly, to do with partial membership scores. Description is a
worthy end in itself. However, once acquainted with a set of
valid partial membership scores, one will also be inclined to
put partial membership scores to work in explanatory models.
This essay does not tackle that problem. However, it is easy to
imagine statistical tests in which a binary measure of, say,
presidentialism is replaced with a family resemblance measure
of that class. Indeed, the evaluation of partial membership in
explanatory models would be a productive next step.
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To a consumer of methods in political science, the act of choos-
ing an appropriate model can resemble the process of buying a
new car. The journal article that introduces the method gener-
ally plays up its strengths while giving short shrift to its po-
tential weaknesses, and other users often have little incentive
to dwell on its potential shortcomings. “Check out this year’s
new model!” the author seems to say. “It lets you make asymp-
totically unbiased estimates with fewer observations than your
existing model—which,” and here the voice drops to a whis-
per—“can provide really terrible answers in circumstances
like these. And nothing could be simpler to use! Just down-
load this Stata package and add a single line of code to your
batch file.”
Practitioners are generally looking for a tool to solve a
particular problem, not an in-depth discussion of the pros and
cons of a particular method or set of methods. They often
don’t stop to take a close look under the hood or to ask the
hard questions. “Asymptotically unbiased, you say... but what
about the precision?” “Ah, you say you want precision? Per-
haps you’d like to take a look at this model over here....”
As a result, many scholars doing substantive research
tend to hop from one flashy new model to another without
fully exploring the capabilities and limitations of each. When
next year’s model comes along, they jump on that, every bit as
disdainful of last year’s methods as they were of those that
came the year before. Should they come across a crosstab or a
chi-squared test in a published paper, they shake their heads
sadly at the author’s methodological naïveté. It rarely occurs
to them that the chi-squared test has been chugging along
reliably for more than a century, while newer, flashier models
have ended up in the ditch.
Rectifying this situation mainly involves more, and better,
methods training for practitioners. In the short run, however,
we can offer some straightforward advice to applied research-
ers  to  help  get  to  the  heart  of  the  issue.  Perhaps  the  most
important of these is this: You rarely get something for noth-
ing. More inferential oomph generally comes at a cost, and it is
important to know what that cost is before adopting the model.
To illustrate this point, I will discuss four different ways to
model interactions: fs/QCA, multiplicative interaction terms, a
stochastic frontier model, and Boolean logit. They are located,
roughly, on a spectrum between assumption-intensive (fs/QCA)
and information-intensive (Boolean logit). Each has some ad-
vantages vis-à-vis the others, but in every case those advan-
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